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Abstract. Pairing-based cryptosystems have been widely researched,
and several efficient hardware implementations of pairings have also been
proposed. However, side channel attacks (SCAs) are serious attacks on
hardware implementations. Whelan et al. pointed out that pairings ex-
cept the ηT pairing might not be vulnerable against SCAs by setting the
secret point to the first parameter [25]. This paper deals with SCAs for
the ηT pairing over F3n . To our knowledge, the randomized-projective-
coordinate method has the smallest overhead among all countermeasures
against SCAs for the ηT pairing. The cost of that overhead is 3nM ,
where M is the cost of a multiplication in F3n . In this paper, we pro-
pose another countermeasure based on random value additions (xp + λ)
and (yp + λ), where P = (xp, yp) is the input point, and λ is a ran-
dom value in F3n . The countermeasure using the random value addition
was relatively slow in the case of the scalar multiplication of elliptic
curve cryptosystems. However, in the case of the ηT pairing, we can
construct an efficient countermeasure due to the form of the function
gP (x, y) = y
3
py− (x3p + x− 1)2 for a point P = (xp, yp). The overhead of
our proposed scheme is just 0.5nM , which is a reduction of more than
75% compared with the randomized-projective-coordinate method.
Keywords: ηT pairing, Tate pairing, side channel attacks, random value
addition
1 Introduction
Pairings over elliptic curves are functions from two points on an elliptic curve
to an element over finite fields that exhibit bilinearity and non-degeneracy. Tate
pairing is a popular pairing and the Miller algorithm is the first efficient al-
gorithm for computing Tate pairing [18]. Barreto et al. improved the Miller
algorithm by denominator elimination, which is called the BKLS algorithm in
this paper [1]. Moreover, the ηT pairing [2] and Ate pairing [10] are efficient
algorithms for computing the Tate pairing for supersingular curves and ordinary
curves, respectively. The Ate pairing is a variation of the BKLS algorithm. How-
ever, the ηT pairing requires a special algorithm that arises from the function
gP (x, y) = y3py − (x3p + x− 1)2 for a point P = (xp, yp).
There have been many research studies on software and hardware implemen-
tations of pairings. Indeed, pairings have implemented on FPGAs [7, 12, 23, 20,
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3] and smart cards [22]. On the other hand, side channel attacks (SCAs) reveal
secret data on hardware devices by monitoring side channel information such as
power consumption and timing [15, 16]. Therefore, hardware devices executing
cryptographic algorithms with secret data need countermeasures against SCAs.
Countermeasures for pairing devices have recently been investigated [21, 19,
25, 13, 26]. Let e(P,Q) be a pairing for two points P = (xp, yp), Q = (xq, yq)
on the underlying elliptic curve. Scott proposed the method of randomizing the
intermediate value [21]. This method multiplies a random value in the finite field
by a Miller variable. The overhead of this method is 3.5nM for the ηT pairing
over F3n according to our estimation. On the other hand, Coron proposed some
countermeasures against SCAs on the scalar multiplication over an elliptic curve
cryptosystem (ECC) [6]. Page et al. applied Coron’s countermeasures to the
pairing, and proposed two countermeasures [19]. The first countermeasure is the
scalar multiplication and bilinearity method that computes e(αP, βQ)1/αβ for
randomized integers α and β instead of e(P,Q), and its overhead is about 18nM
for the ηT pairing over F3n . The second countermeasure is the point-blinding
method that computes e(P,Q + R)/e(P,R) for randomized point R, and its
overhead is about 7.5nM for the ηT pairing over F3n . Kim et al. evaluated their
efficiency for the ηT pairing over F2n . Moreover, they proposed the randomized-
projective-coordinate method [13]. In this method, settings Xp ← λxp, Yp ←
λyp, and Zp ← λ are performed, and its overhead is 3nM for the ηT pairing over
F3n . Whelan et al. also considered SCAs against pairings [25, 26]. They concluded
that pairings using the BKLS algorithm (such as Ate pairing) might not be
vulnerable against SCAs by setting the secret point P to the first parameter of
e(P,Q). However, a countermeasure is needed for the ηT pairing algorithm due
to its symmetric structure.
In this paper, we provide an improved ηT pairing algorithm over characteris-
tic three, which is secure against SCAs. The proposed scheme is based on random
value additions (xp+ λ) and (yp+ λ), where P = (xp, yp) is the input point and
λ is a random value of F ∗3n . The overhead of the proposed countermeasure is
just 0.5nM for the ηT pairing over F3n . This method is similar to the random-
ized linearly transformed coordinate (RLC) method for ECC [11, 17] although
RLC is a relatively slow countermeasure against SCAs. However, our method is
a very efficient countermeasure for the ηT pairing. That is an interesting result.
We noted that changing “r0 ← xp + xq + d” to “r0 ← (xp + λ) + (xq − λ) + d”
using a random element λ at Step 5 in Algorithm 1 described in Section 2 fixes
r0. Although we have to randomize the y-coordinate, the resulting cost is not
large. Therefore, randomizations “xp ← xp + λ, yp ← yp + λ, xq ← xq − λ, and
yq ← yq − λ” in Algorithm 1 can be used to derive an efficient countermeasure
against SCAs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we ex-
plain pairings and computational cost of some computations used in this paper.
In Section 3, we briefly review SCAs against hardware implementations of the
ηT pairing. Then, we describe existing countermeasures against SCAs for the
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ηT pairing. In Section 4, we propose an efficient countermeasure based on the
random value addition. In Section 5, we conclude this paper.
2 ηT pairing and Computational Cost
In this section, we first explain the ηT pairing, which is one of the most efficient
pairings proposed by Barreto et al. [2]. Second, we discuss the costs of the multi-
plication in F36n and the scalar multiplication on the supersingular elliptic curve
over F3n . These cost estimations are applied to the comparison among various
countermeasures against SCAs for the ηT pairing.
2.1 ηT pairing
Let F3n be an extension field of extension degree n over F3. Let Eb be a super-
singular elliptic curve defined by
Eb : y2 = x3 − x+ b with b ∈ {1, −1}. (1)
All supersingular curves are isomorphic to this curve. All points in Eb with the
point at infinity O are denoted by
Eb(F3n) = {(x, y) ∈ F3n × F3n : y2 = x3 − x+ b} ∪ {O}.
Then, Eb(F3n) forms a group, and the summation P + Q ∈ Eb(F3n) for any
P,Q ∈ Eb(F3n) is computed by an explicit formula [9, 24]. For P ∈ Eb(F3n) and
an integer m(6= 0), the operation
mP = P + P + · · ·+ P (summation of m terms)
is called the scalar multiplication.
The extension degree n satisfies gcd(n, 6) = 1 because n is chosen to be a
prime [2]. Then, n satisfies n ≡ 1, 5, 7, 11 (mod 12).
Denote the number of elements in the set S by #S. Then, we know that
#Eb(F3n) = 3n + 1 + b′3(n+1)/2,
where b′ is defined by the following equation:
b′ =
{
b if n ≡ 1, 11 (mod 12),
−b if n ≡ 5, 7 (mod 12).
The distortion map ψ is defined by
ψ(x, y) = (ρ− x, yσ) (2)
with σ2 = −1 and ρ3 = ρ+ b.
Let l3P ′,b′P be a function of a line going through 3P ′ and b′P , and let
gR(x, y) = y3ry − (x3r + x− b)2
4 Masaaki Shirase, Tsuyoshi Takagi, and Eiji Okamoto
Algorithm 1 : Computation of ηT pairing for n ≡ 1 (mod 12)
input: P = (xp, yp), Q = (xq, yq) ∈ Eb(F3n)
output: (ηT (P,Q)
3(n+1)/2)W ∈ F ∗36n
1. if b′ = 1 then yp ← −yp
2. R0 ← −yp(xp + xq + b) + yqσ + ypρ
3. d← b
4. for i← 0 to (n− 1)/2 do
5. r0 ← xp + xq + d
6. R1 ← −r20 + ypyqσ − r0ρ− ρ2
7. R0 ← R0R1
8. yp ← −yp
9. xq ← x9q, yq ← y9q
10. R0 ← R30
11. d← d− b (mod 3)
12. end for
13. return RW0
be a function whose divisor is (gR) = 3(R)+(−3R)−4(O) for R = (xr, yr). The
ηT pairing,
ηT : Eb(F3n)× Eb(F3n)→ F ∗36n
is defined by
ηT (P,Q) = l3P ′,b′P (ψ(Q))
(n−1)/2∏
j=0
g3−jP ′(ψ(Q))3
j
, (3)
where P,Q ∈ Eb(F3n) and P ′ = 3(n−1)/2P . Note that gR only has such a simple
form for supersingular elliptic curve Eb(F3n). To obtain the bilinearity of the ηT
pairing, we need a powering by
W = (33n − 1)(3n + 1)(3n + 1− b′(3(n+1))) (= (36n − 1)/#Eb(F3n) ). (4)
Then, ηT (aP,Q)W = ηT (P, aQ)W = (ηT (P,Q)W )a holds for any non-zero inte-
ger a. This powering by W is called the final exponentiation.
Next, we explain a relationship between the ηT pairing and Tate pairing1
e : Eb(F3n)×Eb(F3n)→ F ∗36n , which is often used in practice. Then, there is a
relationship between the ηT pairing and Tate pairing,
(ηT (P,Q)W )3T
2
= e(P,Q)Z ,
where T and Z are integers defined by
T = 3(n+1)/2 + b′, Z = −b′3(n+3)/2.
Eq. (3) provides Algorithm 1 for computing the ηT pairing over F3n , which
is the no-cube-root version proposed by Beuchat et al. [3].
1 More precisely e is the modified Tate pairing.
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2.2 Cost of Some Computations
In this section, we describe computational costs of a multiplication in F36n , Algo-
rithm 1, and a point addition and a scalar multiplication of a point on Eb(F3n).
These descriptions are required to compare the cost of our countermeasure with
other existing countermeasures.
Some notations about the computational costs in F3n are defined as fol-
lows: M,C, I,A, and As are computational costs of a multiplication, a cubing,
an inversion, an addition/subtraction, and some additions/subtractions in F3n ,
respectively. We know that the cost of cubing in F36n is 6M +As.
We use the basis {1, σ, ρ, σρ, ρ2, σρ2} for the extension field F36n , where σ
and ρ are defined for the distortion map (Eq. (2)). For simplicity, a0 + a1σ +
a2ρ+ a3σρ+ a4ρ2 + a5σρ2 ∈ F36n is represented as (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5).
We have the following computational costs of some multiplications with spe-
cial constant coefficients in F36n . Note that Step 7 in Algorithm 1 is computed
by (ii) (not (i)).
Property 1. Multiplications in F36n are computed by the Karatsuba method [14]
with the following costs:
(i) 18M +As for multiplication (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)× (b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) [12],
(ii) 13M +As for multiplication (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)× (b0, b1, b2, 0,−1, 0) [8],
(iii) 15M +As for multiplication (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)× (b0, b1, b2, 0, b4, 0).
Proof. Refer to Appendix A for the proof of (iii). uunionsq
The cost of Algorithm 1 except the final exponentiation (Step 13) is estimated
using Property 1. Note that a multiplication of Step 7, R0R1, costs 13M +
As according to Property 1. Thus, Steps 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 cost M , As,
2M , 13M +As, As, 4C, and 6C +As, respectively. Therefore, the total cost of
Algorithm 1 except the final exponentiation is M + ((n + 1)/2) · (As + 2M +
13M +As+As+ 4C + 6C +As) = (7.5n+ 8.5)M + (5n+ 5)C +As.
A scalar multiplication on Eb(F3n) is efficiently performed with the tripling-
and-addition method because a computation of tripling the point is very efficient.
Indeed, a tripling point and a point addition using a projective coordinate sys-
tem cost M + 6C and 12M + 4C, respectively. Then, a computation of scalar
multiplication of mP costs
(9 log3m)M + (8.7 log3m)C + 2I (5)
on average because log3m point triplings and 2/3 · log3m point additions on
average and two inversions for restoring a point to the affine coordinate are
required [9].
3 Previous Countermeasures against SCAs
In this section, we review previously known SCAs on pairing and countermea-
sures against them.
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SCAs try to reveal the secret information on hardware devices by selectively
inputting data into the device and monitoring the side channel information such
as power consumption and timing while the device executes a cryptographic
algorithm [15, 16].
Scott first pointed out that SCAs can be used against pairing devices when P
is public and Q is secret for the input of pairing e(P,Q) [21]. For example, such
a situation appears in Boneh and Franklin’s identity-based encryption [4]. More-
over, Scott proposed two countermeasures, namely the scalar multiplication and
bilinearity method and the method of randomizing the intermediate value. Page
et al. [19] showed that SCAs can reveal secret data by monitoring a multiplica-
tion of the secret data by public data. They also proposed two countermeasures
against these attacks, the improved scalar multiplication and bilinearity method
and the point-blinding method. Kim et al. [13] showed that a computation of
α · (β + γ) can also be a subject of differential power analysis (DPA) attacks,
where α and β are secret, and γ is public. They proposed a countermeasure,
the randomized-projective-coordinate method, and that was improved by Choi et
al. [5].
Whelan et al. [25] explained that a multiplication of secret data by public
data, and squaring and square-root computations of secret data became subjects
of SCAs if we use the pairing over finite fields of characteristic two. Moreover,
they discuss that one input point Q of pairing e(P,Q) is fixed (never changed)
during computation of the BKLS algorithm. Thus, one might resist SCAs by
setting the secret data to the updating point P . On the contrary, one needs a
countermeasure in the case of the ηT pairing due to its symmetric structure.
Let P = (xp, yp) and Q = (xq, yq) be points input into Algorithm 1. If P is
a secret point, the target operations of SCA are yp(xp + xq + b) in Step 2, r20 in
Step 6, ypyq in Step 6, or R0R1 in Step 7. Moreover, if Q is a secret point, then
x9q or y
9
q in Step 9 could also be the target of the attack.
In the remainder of this section, we explain details of the above countermea-
sures and estimate their costs when using the ηT pairing over F3n .
3.1 Scalar Multiplication and Bilinearity Method [19]
In the scalar multiplication and bilinearity method, an integer α with 0 ≤ α < l
is selected at random by a device, and another integer β = (α−1 mod l) is
computed, where l is the largest prime factor of the order of the points. The
device then computes
ηT (αP, βQ)W ,
which is equal to ηT (P,Q)W because ηT (αP, βQ)W =(ηT (P,Q)W )αβ=ηT (P,Q)W
due to the bilinearity of the ηT pairing. Even if point Q is selected by the at-
tacker, it is changed to βQ by the device, and the attacker cannot know βQ.
Therefore, this method provides a secure computation method for the ηT pairing
against SCAs. The overhead is two scalar multiplications on the elliptic curve,
which is 18nM + 17.4nC + 2I on average according to Eq. (5) because α and
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β ≈ 3n and log3 α ≈ log3 β ≈ n. Now, the costs of the computation of β and
additions/subtractions is ignored.
3.2 Point-Blinding Method [19]
The point-blinding method computes
(ηT (P,Q+R) · ηT (P,−R))W ,
where point R is selected by the device at random, and thus, the attacker can-
not control R. Note that this value is equal to ηT (P,Q)W because (ηT (P,Q +
R) · ηT (P,−R))W = ηT (P,Q + R)W · ηT (P,−R)W = ηT (P,Q)W · ηT (P,R)W ·
(ηT (P,R)W )−1 = ηT (P,Q)W due to the bilinearity of the ηT pairing. The over-
head is a point addition on the elliptic curve (12M + 2I) (2I is needed for
conversion of coordinates), a computation of the ηT pairing without final expo-
nentiation ((7.5n + 8.5)M + (5n + 5)C), and a multiplication in F36n (18M).
Note that there is no cost for the computation of −R because −R = (xr,−yr)
for R = (xr, yr). Then, the overhead cost is (7.5n+ 38.5)M + (5n+ 5)C + 2I.
3.3 Method of Randomizing Intermediate Value [21]
In the method of randomizing the intermediate value proposed by Scott, ran-
domizations are performed for intermediate values related to Q and R0 in loops
of the pairing algorithm. Then, Steps 2, 5, and 6 in Algorithm 1 are modified as
follows:
2. R0 ← −λ · yp(xp + xq + b) + λ · yqσ + λ · ypρ
5. r0 ← λ · xp + λ · xq + λ · d
6. R1 ← −λ · r20 + λ · ypyqσ − λ · r0ρ− λ · ρ2
where λ is a random value in F ∗3n selected by the device. Denote by Algorithm 1’
the modified Algorithm 1. Then, (R0 in Step 12 of Algorithm 1) = λ′(R0 in Step
12 of Algorithm 1’) for some λ′ ∈ F ∗3n . However, the effect of λ′ is removed by
the final exponentiation, namely (λ′ ·ηT (P,Q))W = ηT (P,Q)W forW of Eq. (4).
Indeed, for r ∈ F ∗33n or r ∈ F ∗3n
rW = 1 (6)
is in general satisfied because
rW = r(3
3n−1)(3n+1)(3n+1−b′(3(n+1))) = 1(3
n+1)(3n+1−b′(3(n+1))) = 1.
Scott recommends to multiply intermediate values by λ not at once but one by
one for security. Then, the overheads of Steps 2, 5, and 6 are 3M , 3M , and 3M ,
respectively. Note that Step 7 also creates an overhead because R1 has the form
of (b0, b1, b2, 0, b4, 0) not (b0, b1, b2, 0,−1, 0). Then, Step 7 takes 15M not 13M
according to Property 1; namely, the overhead of Step 7 is 2M . Therefore, the
total overhead of this method is (3.5n+ 6.5)M .
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Algorithm 2 : Computation of the ηt pairing with the randomized
projective coordinate method for n ≡ 1 (mod 12)
input: P = (xp, yp), Q = (xq, yq) ∈ Eb(F3n)
output: (ηT (P,Q)
3(n+1)/2)W ∈ F ∗36n
randomizing P randomizing Q
0. (Xp, Yp, Zp)← (λxp, λyp, λ) 0. (Xq, Yq, Zq)← (λxq, λyq, λ)
(λ is a random value in F ∗3n) (λ is a random value in F ∗3n)
1. if b′ = 1 then Yp ← −Yp 1. if b′ = 1 then yp ← −yp
2. R0 ← −Yp (Xp + Zp (xq + b)) 2. R0 ← −yp (Zq (xp + b) +Xq)
+Z2p yqσ + Zp Ypρ +yqσ + Zq ypρ
3. d← b 3. d← b
4. for i← 0 to (n− 1)/2 do 4. for i← 0 to (n− 1)/2 do
5. r0 ← Xp + Zp (xq + d) 5. r0 ← Zq (xq + d) +Xq
6. R1 ← −r20 + Zp Yp yqσ 6. R1 ← −r20 + Zq yp Yqσ
−Zp r0ρ− Z2p ρ2 −Zq r0ρ− Z2q ρ2
7. R0 ← R0R1 7. R0 ← R0R1
8. Yp ← −Yp 8. yp ← −yp
9. xq ← x9q, yq ← y9q 9. Xq ← X9q , Yq ← Y 9q , Zq ← Z9q
10. R0 ← R30 10. R0 ← R30
11. d← d− b (mod 3) 11. d← d− b (mod 3)
12. end for 12. end for
13. return RW0 13. return R
W
0
3.4 Randomized-Projective-Coordinate Method
Kim et al. proposed a randomized-projective-coordinate method for the ηT pair-
ing algorithm over characteristic two [13].
This paper gives a characteristic three version of the randomized-projective-
coordinate algorithm (Algorithm 2), where the left side uses the projective coor-
dinate for P , and the right side does that forQ. AlthoughR0 = λ′ηT (P,Q)3
(n+1)/2
holds for some λ′ ∈ F ∗3n at Step 12 in both sides of Algorithm 2, the effect of
λ′ is removed by the final exponentiation as well as the method of randomizing
the intermediate value. Note that like the method of randomizing the interme-
diate value, the cost of Step 7 in each side of Algorithm 2 is 15M ; namely,
the overhead is 2M for each side. The cost of the left side of Algorithm 2
is (10.5 + 17.5)M + (5n + 5)C + As. Then, the overhead is (3n + 9)M . The
cost of the right side is (10.5 + 15.5)M + (6n + 6)C. Then, the overhead is
(3n + 7)M + (n + 1)C. When 2M > (n + 1)C, for example, when C = 0 using
a normal basis of F3n over F3, the left side is more efficient than the right side.
In other cases, the right side is more efficient than the left side.
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Algorithm 3 : Proposed secure ηT pairing algorithm against SCAs
for n ≡ 1 (mod 12)
input: P = (xp, yp), Q = (xq, yq) ∈ Eb(F3n)
output: (ηT (P,Q))
3(n+1)/2 ∈ F ∗36n
1-1. if b′ = 1 then yp ← −yp
1-2. Yp ← λ′yp, Yq ← λ′yq (λ′ is a random value in F ∗3n)
1-3. xp ← xp + λ, yp ← yp + λ, xq ← xq − λ, yq ← yq − λ, λ′′ ← λ2
(λ is a random value in F ∗3n , λ = λ′ is possible)
2. R0 ← −Yp(xp + xq + b) + Yqσ + Ypρ
3. d← b
4. for i← 0 to (n− 1)/2 do
5. r0 ← xp + xq + d
6. R1 ← −(r0 + λ)(r0 − λ)− λ′′ + (ypyq + λ(yp − yq − λ))σ − r0ρ− ρ2
7. R0 ← R0R1
8. xp ← xp − λ+ λ9, yp ← −yp + λ+ λ9
9. xq ← x9q, yq ← y9q , λ← λ9, λ′′ ← λ′′ 9
10. R0 ← R30
11. d← d− b (mod 3)
12. end for
13. return RW0
4 Proposed Countermeasure
In this section, we propose an efficient countermeasure against SCAs for the
computation of ηT pairing over F3n . The basic strategy is as follows: (1) The
point (xp, yp) input into the ηT pairing is randomized by the random value
additions (xp + λ) and (yp + λ), where λ is a random value in F ∗3n . (2) The
effects of the random additions are removed at some steps in the algorithm. The
proposed algorithm is represented as Algorithm 3.
4.1 Correctness of Algorithm 3
In the following, we prove that Algorithm 3 outputs the correct value of the ηT
pairing over F3n .
We try to investigate the differences between Algorithms 1 and 3. To dis-
tinguish the values in Algorithm 1 from those in Algorithm 3, each variable is
denoted by suffix “1” or “3”, respectively. For example, xp1 is denoted by xp in
Algorithm 1. Without of generality we can assume λ′ = 1 due to Eq. (6). Then,
we can prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. Suppose λ′ = 1, then we have the following relationships
xp3 = xp1 + λ9
i
, yp3 = yp1 + λ9
i
, xq3 = xq1 − λ9i , and yq3 = yq1 − λ9i (7)
at the beginning of the i-th iteration of Algorithms 1 and 3.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. We can easily see that Eq. (7) is
satisfied for i = 0 at Step 1-3 of Algorithm 3. Next, suppose that at the i-th
iteration Eq. (7) is correct. In Algorithm 1, xp1, yp1, xq1, and yq1 are updated as
xp1,−yp1, x9q1, and y9q1, respectively. At Step 8 of the i-th iteration in Algorithm
3, xp3 is updated as
xp3 ← xp3 − λ9i + λ9i+1 = (xp1 + λ9i)− λ9i + λ9i+1 = xp1 + λ9i+1 ,
and yp3 is updated as
yp3 ← −yp3 + λ9i + λ9i+1 = −(yp1 + λ9i) + λ9i + λ9i+1 = −yp1 + λ9i+1 .
At Step 9 of the i-th iteration in Algorithm 3, xq3 and yq3 are updated as
xq3 ← x9q3 = (xq1−λ9
i
)9 = x9q1−λ9
i+1
, and yq3 ← y9q3 = (yq1−λ9
i
)9 = y9q1−λ9
i+1
,
respectively. Therefore, Eq. (7) is satisfied at the beginning of every (i + 1)-th
iteration. uunionsq
To prove the correctness of Algorithm 3, showing that
r03 = r01 and R13 = R11
are satisfied at every i-th iteration under the assumption λ′ = 1 is sufficient.
Indeed, at every i-th iteration we have the relationship
r03 = xp3 + xq3 + d = (xp1 + λ9
i
) + (xq1 − λ9i) + d = xp1 + xq1 + d = r01 (8)
and
R13 = −(r03 + λ)(r03 − λ)− λ′′ + (yp3yq3 + λ(yp3 − yq3 − λ))σ − r0ρ− ρ2
= −r203 + λ2 − λ′′ + (yp3yq3 + λ(yp3 − yq3 − λ))σ − r0ρ− ρ2
= −r201 + yp1yq1σ − r01ρ− ρ2
= R11
from Eqs. (7) and (8) because λ′′ = λ2 holds in every i-th iteration. Therefore,
we proved the correctness of Algorithm 3.
4.2 Security
We discuss the security of Algorithm 3 against SCAs. The attacker targets Steps
2, 5, 6, and 7 in Algorithm 3. However, all values are randomized by random
values λ and λ′′ for Steps 2, 5, and 6. Step 7 is also secure because, although R1
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Table 1. Comparison of overheads for countermeasure against SCAs
Countermeasure method Additional Cost
Point Multiplication and Bilinearity Method [19] 18nM + 17.4nC + 2I
Point-Blinding Method [19] (7.5n+ 38.5)M + (5n+ 5)C + 2I
Method of Randomizing the Intermediate Value [21] (3.5n+ 6.5)M
Left Side of Algorithm 2∗ (3n+ 9)M
Right Side of Algorithm 2∗ (3n+ 7)M + (n+ 1)C
The Proposed Method (Algorithm 3) (0.5n+ 3.5)M+ (3n+ 3)C
∗) Algorithm 2 is the characteristic three version of the randomized-projective-
coordinate method [13].
is not randomized, R0 is randomized by λ′ at Step 1-2. An explanation may be
needed for Step 6. Note that
−(r0 + λ)(r0 − λ)− λ′′ = −r20
because λ′′ is equal to λ2, as noted above. However, we need the computation
of “−(r0 + λ)(r0 − λ) − λ′′” (not r20) because r0 is unchangeable either with
the randomization at Step 1-3 or without it. Therefore, if this process is not
performed, then the attacker may guess r20.
4.3 Comparison with Other Methods
We estimate the computational cost of the proposed scheme and compare it with
the previously known methods described in Section 3. Now, we suppose that the
cost of a squaring is equal to that of a multiplication.
Here, we ignore the costs of additions/subtractions. Step 7 in Algorithm 3
requires 13M as well as Algorithm 1 because R1 in Algorithm 3 has the form of
(b0, b1, b2, 0,−1, 0) due to Property 1. Note that this sparse multiplication can be
applied to neither Algorithm 2 nor the method of randomizing the intermediate
value. Steps 1-2, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 in Algorithm 3 cost 3M ,M , 3M , 13M , 2C,
6C, and 6C, respectively. Therefore, the total cost of Algorithm 3 except the
final exponentiation is 3M +M + ((n+ 1)/2) · (3M + 13M + 2C + 6C + 6C) =
(8n+ 12)M + (7n+ 7)C. Then, the overhead is (0.5n+ 3.5)M + (3n+ 3C).
A comparison of the proposed countermeasure with existing countermeasures
is shown in Table 1. Note that the extension degree should satisfy n ≥ 97 for
security reasons. We estimate the cost of cubing to be C = 0.07M for the poly-
nomial basis [8, 20] and C = 0 for the normal basis on hardware. The overhead of
the proposed method is 72.58M for C = 0.07M and n = 97 and that of the left
side of Algorithm 2 is 300M , which is the smallest of any algorithm. Then, the
overhead cost is reduced by 76%. When we choose a sufficiently large n, then the
overhead of the proposed method and Algorithm 2 becomes 0.5nM and 3nM ,
respectively, for C = 0. In this case, the overhead is reduced by 83%.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a variation of the ηT pairing over F3n that is secure
against SCAs. The randomization technique in the proposed scheme uses the
random value additions xp+λ and yp+λ for the input point P = (xp, yp) and a
random value λ ∈ F ∗3n . Interestingly, the symmetric structure of the ηT pairing
provides a simple algebraic equation with a random value of λ in the main loop.
Therefore, the proposed scheme has the smallest overhead of the randomization
secure against SCAs, which is just 0.5nM for the ηT pairing over F3n . That is
reduced by more than 75% compared with the randomized-projective-coordinate
method. The method of this paper is applied to the Duursma-Lee algorithm due
to its similarity with the ηT pairing algorithm.
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A Proof of Property 1
Property 1. Multiplications in F36n are computed by the Karatsuba method [14]
with the following cost:
(i) 18M +As for multiplication (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)× (b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) [12],
(ii) 13M +As for multiplication (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)× (b0, b1, b2, 0,−1, 0) [8],
(iii) 15M +As for multiplication (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)× (b0, b1, b2, 0, b4, 0).
Proof. (i) and (ii) are known results. However, we provide proofs of all cases
because an explanation of (i) is needed to show (iii), and there may not be an
explicit proof of (ii). First, consider a multiplication in F32n
(a0 + a1σ)× (b0 + b1σ) = (a0b0 − a1b1) + (a0b1 + a1b0)σ.
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Using the Karatsuba method costs 3M +As. Indeed, (a0b1 − a1b0) can be com-
puted as (a0b1 − a1b0) = (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1)− a0b0 − a1b1. Then, three multipli-
cations, a0b0, a1b1, and (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1) are needed to compute (a0 + a1σ) ×
(b0 + b1σ).
(i) Suppose that (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)×(b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) = (c0, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5).
Let a˜i(i+1), b˜i(i+1), and c˜i(i+1) be elements in F32n defined by ai + ai+1σ, bi +
bi+1σ, and ci+ci+1σ, respectively, for i = 0, 2, 4. For example, (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)
is represented as a˜01+a˜23ρ+a˜45ρ2. Then, (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)×(b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5)
is computed as follows:
d˜0 = a˜01b˜01,
d˜1 = (a˜01 + a˜23)(b˜01 + b˜23)− a˜01b˜01 − a˜23b˜23,
d˜2 = (a˜01 + a˜45)(b˜01 + b˜45) + a˜23b˜23 − a˜01b˜01 − a˜45b˜45,
d˜3 = (a˜23 + a˜45)(b˜23 + b˜45)− a˜23b˜23 − a˜45b˜45,
d˜4 = a˜45b˜45,
(9)
and
c˜01 = d˜0 + bd˜3,
c˜23 = d˜1 + d˜3 + bd˜4,
c˜45 = d˜2 + d˜4,
where b = 1 or −1 defined by Eq. (1). Therefore, a multiplication in F36n takes
6 multiplications,
a˜01b˜01, a˜23b˜23, a˜45b˜45, (a˜01 + a˜23)(b˜01 + b˜23), (a˜01 + a˜45)(b˜01 + b˜45),
and (a˜23 + a˜45)(b˜23 + b˜45),
and some additions/subtractions in F32n . Then a multiplication in F36n takes
18M +As.
(ii) In this case, b˜23 = b2 and b˜45 = −1 in Eq. (9). Each of a˜01b˜01, (a˜01+a˜23)(b˜01+
b˜23), and (a˜01+a˜45)(b˜01+b˜45) takes 3M+As, but each of the other multiplications
takes a smaller cost. Indeed, a˜23b˜23 = a2b2 + a3b2σ takes 2M + As, a˜45b˜45 =
−a4 − a5σ takes no cost, and (a˜23 + a˜45)(b˜23 + b˜45) = (a2 + a4)(b2 − 1) + (a3 +
a5)(b2−1)σ takes 2M+As. Therefore, (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)×(b0, b1, b2, 0,−1, 0)
takes 13(= 3× 3 + 2 + 0 + 2)M +As.
(iii) In this case b˜23 = b2 and b˜45 = b4 in Eq. (9). Each of a˜01b˜01, (a˜01+a˜23)(b˜01+
b˜23) and (a˜01+ a˜45)(b˜01+ b˜45) takes 3M +As as well as (ii). On the other hand,
each of the other multiplications takes 2M +As because a˜23b˜23 = a2b2 + a3b2σ,
a˜45b˜45 = a4b4 + a5b4σ, and (a˜23 + a˜45)(b˜23 + b˜45) = (a2 + a4)(b2 + b4) + (a3 +
a5)(b2 + b4)σ. Therefore, (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) × (b0, b1, b2, 0, b4, 0) takes 15(=
3× 3 + 3× 2)M +As. ¤
